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This paper provides new empirical insights on the elasticity of taxable income for
Germany. Using a rich panel of German income tax return data, the tax reforms of
2004 and 2005 are exploited implementing a new dynamic income model. Showing and
discussing potential estimation problems of the most prominent model in the literature
by Gruber and Saez (2002), this dynamic model delivers signiﬁcant smaller estimates
of the elasticity of taxable income. The overall estimate is 0.36 and robust against a
number of sensitivity checks including non linear income controls. Elasticities diﬀer
between married and single assessed taxpayers with an elasticity of 0.17 for single and
0.44 for married taxpayers. These elasticities are similar to recent German results and
considerablly smaller than recent results for the US from Weber(2014).
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1 Introduction
A series of major reforms, the so called Agenda 2010, introduced fundamental reforms on
both the German labor market and to the German personal income taxation in the early
2000s. The reforms aimed to foster economic growth, reduce unemployment rates and lower
the increasing federal debt. Former Chancellor Schröder recently called the reforms a cure
for Germany formerly known as the sick man Europe's to become the healthy woman
(see Hengst 2012). One of the reform's cornerstones were the Hartz Reforms which changed
active labor market policy fundamentally.1 Another key element were tax reforms which
lowered marginal tax rates in several steps for the whole income distribution to increase
work incentives and discourage tax evasion.
This reﬂects an international trend which saw tax rate reductions in a number of developed
economies in the recent decades.2 Moreover, results for the USA by Feldstein (1995) or Auten
and Carroll (1998) suggested very elastic income responses to tax rate reductions, making tax
reductions an attractive economic tool. Chancellor Schröder's federal government promised
a boost in economic growth, employment and justice from the tax reductions. Moreover,
the bulk of the reforms' revenue losses were expected to be self-ﬁnancing.3 However, a large
body of subsequent literature suggests that income is not as elastic to tax rate changes as
assumed (see Saez et al. 2012).
The elasticity of taxable income (ETI) has been established to measure income growth in
response to changes of the net-of-tax rate, one minus the marginal tax rate. The ETI captures
more dimensions of behavioral responses than labor supply elasticities.4 It is the central
ﬁscal policy parameter and of particular importance for predicting revenue changes from
tax reforms (see Feldstein 1995, 1999). Moreover, the elasticity of taxable income allows
to calculate deadweight losses of income taxation, if marginal costs of tax evasion and tax
1See for instance Caliendo & Steiner (2006) or Eichhorst & Zimmermann (2007) for an evaluation of the
active employment policy implemented by the Hartz Reforms.
2For the period 2000-2010, see for instance Table II.1b, II. 2b and II.3b. of OECD (2010). The Table shows
a reduction in average tax rates in a lot of OECD countries for selected positions in the income distribution
between 2000 and 2010. See also Salanie (2003) page 5 and 6.
3See the coalitions agreement between the social party SPD and the green party Die Grünen in section
III.
4However, note that the ETI is a local elasticity that measures income changes in response to the actual
tax rate change. In contrast to the labor supply elasticity, the ETI does not include tax rate changes at
other positions of the income distribution which might have an eﬀect on the individual budget restriction.
Unfortunately, German tax data do not comprise information about working hours and allows not to compute
labor supply elasticities.
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avoidance equal the marginal tax rate (see Feldstein 1999).5 Feldstein's (1995) seminal paper
was ﬁrst to ﬁnd taxable income elasticity exceeding 1, triggering a large body of literature
estimating the size of the elasticity.6 A very comprehensive overview of empirical results and
econometric methodology is provided in Saez et al. (2012). The authors survey the most
common estimation strategies, discuss possible drawbacks and identiﬁcation issues. The
majority of previous empirical results have focused on US tax reforms and the estimation of
elasticity for the USA, with growing literature in Europe.7 US results are within a wide range
of values between 0.12 and 1 (see Saez et al. 2012), with recent results by Weber (2014) of
an ETI of 0.86 for the US.
German ﬁndings tend towards a more moderate size: Gottfried and Witczak (2009) were
ﬁrst to adopt the most prominent model by Gruber and Saez (2002) using individual German
income tax return data. Their preferred speciﬁcation estimated an elasticity of taxable income
for Germany of 0.6. Müller and Schmidt (2012) adopted the approach of Kopczuk (2005),
an extension of Gruber and Saez (2002), and estimated an elasticity with similar results to
Gottfried and Witczak (2009) and elasticities between 0.32 and 0.47.8
Estimating the elasticity of taxable income is challenging due to two reasons: applying valid
instrumentation for the endogenous net-of-tax rate and using appropriate income controls
accounting for income trends such as mean reversion.9
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it discusses Gruber and Saez's
(2002) model which uses a ﬂexible income control and base year income as source for the
instrumentation of the net-of-tax rate. This model delivers consistent results if residuals do
not show signiﬁcant serial correlation. However, in the case of residuals in ﬁrst diﬀerences
or a misspeciﬁed model, this requirement could be violated and estimation results would be
biased.10
Second, I propose an alternative model for the case that residuals show signiﬁcant serial
5Chetty (2009) shows that in case that income sheltering has transfer and/or resource costs, the taxable
income elasticity is not a suﬃcient statistic to calculate deadweight losses from income taxation.
6ETI above 1 is a necessary condition for self-ﬁnancing tax reductions. See Creedy and Gemmell (2014)
for thorough discussion and connection of the Laﬀer curve with values of the ETI.
7Saez et al. (2009) also discuss results for various European countries.
8One other study for Germany exists: Gottfried and Schellhorn (2004) analyzed the 1990 change in
personal income tax schedule for taxpayers in Baden-Wuertemberg. They estimated an elasticity of taxable
income of 0.4, but ﬁnd also high values up to 1.0 when controlling for business income and high-income
taxpayers.
9The net-of-tax rate is endogenous for a progressive income tax code and correlates negatively with taxable
income.
10For instance, Gruber and Saez's (2002) model would be misspeciﬁed in case of an income process including
an individual ﬁxed eﬀect.
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correlation. That model is a special case of the dynamic model proposed by Holmlund and
Söderström (2011) and uses higher lags of base year income as source for the instrumentation
and lagged income growth as income control. Employing a recent and very rich German
income tax panel data spanning the years 2001 to 2006, the German tax reforms of 2004 and
2005 are used to estimate the elasticity of taxable income. Tax cuts were implemented for the
whole distribution of taxable income, with the highest cuts for the lowest tax rates and the
top tax bracket. Applying Gruber and Saez's (2002) model suggests an elasticity of taxable
income for Germany of 0.46, including non-linear income controls. Tests of serial residual
correlation, however, raise doubt about the exogeneity of the instrumented net-of-tax rate
and the income control.11
Results from the here proposed model suggest a rather modest size of the German elasticity of
taxable income of 0.36 in the preferred speciﬁcation. Results are robust against the exclusion
of top incomes (0.36 vs. 0.36), the set of control variables (0.36 vs. 0.31) and the inclusion
of non-linear income controls such as splines (0.36 vs 0.44).
Surprisingly, results from the preferred speciﬁcation are remarkably similar to other recent
estimates from Müller and Schmidt (2012). Müller and Schmidt's (2012) approach, however,
diﬀers from my empirical strategy, apart from the estimation model, in two other crucial
aspects: (1) the authors employ weighted IV regressions and (2) use very strong selection
criteria excluding lower incomes from the sample.12 Replicating Müller and Schmidt's (2012)
selection criteria signiﬁcantly increases results for the elasticity to 0.56 and suggests that
results might underlie a selection bias.
Elasticities are also estimated separately for married and single taxpayers, taking into account
the heavy tax favoring of married taxpayers compared to single taxpayers by the German
tax system. Married taxpayers can beneﬁt from ﬁling taxes together, which reduces average
and marginal tax rates of the primary earner.13 Moreover, married taxpayers might diﬀer
in other unobserved aspects from single taxpayers. Results promote the separate estimation
with the elasticity of taxable income for married taxpayers of 0.44 and a signiﬁcantly lower
elasticity for single taxpayers with 0.17.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 brieﬂy discusses the data
and the data processing. Section 2.3 describes the German tax law and important recent
11A new speciﬁcation of Gruber and Saez's (2002) model by Weber (2014), increases the elasticity to 0.70.
However, tests also indicate systematic serial correlation.
12Taxpayers with base year income below 10,000 Euro are eliminated from their sample.
13Joint tax ﬁling reduces the marginal tax rate of the primary earner if the average income of the married
falls below the top tax bracket and the spouses have uneven high incomes.
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reforms and section 2.4 sheds light on rational loss behavior as well as presents ﬁrst results.
The concluding section 2.5 reviews and interprets the major ﬁndings.
2 The German Income Tax System and Recent Reforms14
The German income tax schedule is directly progressive, i.e. marginal tax liability increases
with taxable income. Income exceeding the basic tax allowance is divided into several brack-
ets. Contrary to most other progressive tax systems, the German tax schedule increases
quadratically with income and is not a step system. The German tax schedule substantially
discriminates between single and married taxpayers.15 Married taxpayers can opt for the
splitting tax schedule to decrease their joint taxation and marginal tax rates.16 The change
of government in Germany in 1998 was associated with intensive discussions about tax and
labor market reforms. The new red-green government agreed upon several reforms of income
and corporate taxation starting in 1999. It was the biggest bundle of income tax reforms in
Germany's history since World War II. Prior to the observation period, two major parts of
that reform bundle were implemented. One was a reform aﬀecting personal income taxation
indirectly.17 The other part of the reform was directly related to personal income taxation
and reduced all marginal tax rates of the German tax schedule. Between 1999 and 2001 the
bottom marginal tax rate was cut from 25.9% to 19.9%, whereas the top marginal tax rate
was reduced by 4.5 percentage points from 53% to 48.5%. Marginal tax rates in between were
reduced accordingly. The most prominent tax reform was announced and passed in 2000 and
consisted of a further gradual reduction of personal income tax schedule, accompanied by
a modest tax base broadening. Parallel to the income tax reform, the German government
implemented the so called Hartz Reforms between 2003 and 2005. These reforms fundamen-
14The ﬁrst half of this section is taken from an earlier joint work with Nima Massarrat-Mashhadi (2012)
(see Massarrat-Mashhadi and Werdt (2012)).
15Steiner and Wrohlich (2008) provide evidence that joint taxation in Germany aﬀects economic dimension
such as work incentives and household welfare.
16Marginal tax rates for married taxpayers are determined as if one single taxpayer would earn the average
taxpayers income. Accordingly, the tax burden is calculated as twice as much the single taxpayer with the
average income would have to pay. Given the progressive schedule, married taxpayers with uneven distributed
incomes can reduce their overall tax burden. Marginal tax rates for married taxpayers decrease until the
average income is in the top bracket. ODonoghue and Sutherland (1999) discuss how joint taxation aﬀects
work incentives of the secondary earner.
17It was a signiﬁcant paradigmatic change in corporate taxation, taking place between 2000 and 2001. Its
main attribute was the reduction of the corporate tax rate from 45% to 25% combined with simultaneous
corporate tax base broadening. The reform of corporate taxation also included several adjustments regarding
the income taxation.
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tally changed institutional and legal framework of the labor market and the beneﬁt system
that might aﬀect low wage earners.18
The tax reform combines several steps which lowered the income tax schedule in 2001, 2004
and 2005. Besides the reduction of all marginal tax rates, the basic tax allowance was slightly
increased from 7,206 Euro in 2001 up to 7,664 Euro in 2005.
Figure 1 shows the linear increasing marginal tax rates with diﬀerent slopes in the diﬀerent
brackets. The top marginal tax rate of 48.5% in 2001 (45% in 2004; 42% in 2005) begins at
a taxable income of approximately 52000 Euro.
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Figure 2 shows the tax rate changes in absolute values along the distribution of taxable
income for taxable income exceeding the basic allowance in 2004. A small range of income
just above the basic allowance experienced the biggest tax cuts up to 4.6 percentage points.19
The second biggest tax cuts were conducted on the top tax bracket. The brackets in between
experienced a lower, but increasing tax cut inducing substantial exogenous tax rate variation.
18Unfortunately, tax data do not allow to control for these changes.
19Results for the elasticity of taxable income are sensitive to the exclusion of taxpayers with less than
10,000 Euro taxable income. Estimates without those taxpayers increase the elasticities signiﬁcantly.
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3 Data and Data Processing20
Relevant information generated in the process of taxation is documented in the income tax re-
turn: information on the household composition, declaration of income from diﬀerent sources,
granted deductions and exemptions, calculation of taxable income and personal income tax
payment.21 The German Federal Statistical Oﬃce collects the oﬃcial income tax returns
electronically as Income Tax Statistics, providing the basis for the German Taxpayer Panel.
Individual taxpayers IDs are used to link annual cross section income tax returns over time
to create the panel. It contains income tax returns of approximately 19 million observations
in a balanced panel.22 The panel is very representative for top and medium incomes and
includes a high share of low incomes who are likely not to ﬁle a tax return in all six years
of the data.23 Unfortunately, German wage earners might be underrepresented, since they
20The ﬁrst half of this section is taken from an earlier joint work with Nima Massarrat-Mashhadi (see
Massarrat-Mashhadi and Werdt (2012)).
21German tax data only includes tax relevant information. Further demographic information like education,
profession, parents income or wealth are not available.
22The German Taxpayer Panel does not include tax returns which are only available for a subset of years
and are not consistently linkable. I assume that the probability of being included in the sample is random and
uncorrelated with income and especially with income growth. This might be a strong assumption, however,
conﬁdential restrictions do not allow to match the data with other data to test this assumption.
23Jenderny (2014) compares the panel data with the cross sectional basis and shows that only incomes
close to zero are low represented in the data.
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were not forced to ﬁle tax return unless they have other additional incomes.24 Taxpayers
with demographic changes such as marriage or divorce are also only partially included.25 In
some cases, taxpayers that move from one state to another might also change their taxpayers
ID and are not consistent linkable. Several socio-demographic characteristics of taxpayers,
such as age, number of children, church membership and marital status are observable. A
sample of 5% is drawn and made available for scientiﬁc purposes, based on four stratiﬁcation
criteria, i.e. federal state, assessment type, main type of income and total income. High
incomes above 150,000 mean income are highly over-sampled and 85% of those are included
in the 5% sample. The stratiﬁcation procedure aims to optimize the sample with regard to
standard errors of total income over time. Observation weights are generated accordingly.26
The sample for the analysis consists of three one-year-pairs, pooling the years with the in-
come growth from 2003 to 2004, 2004 to 2005 and 2005 to 2006.27 Each pair consists of
928,993 taxpayers resulting in a balanced panel of 2,786,979 observations. Results are dawn
from a sub-sample which excludes observations according to three categories: (1) observa-
tions which do not satisfy technical model requirements: models in the literature of taxable
income elasticity are based on log-log speciﬁcations, accordingly negative incomes are not
deﬁned, which deletes 455,193 observations.28 (2) Taxpayers that do not pay taxes in the
base year t − 1 and in year t, thus have marginal tax rates of zero, are excluded. That re-
duces the sample by 383,015 observations.29 (3) Taxpayers with severe demographic changes
such as marriage, divorce or one-time exceptional proﬁts are also excluded, deleting 260,786
observations and leaving a sample of 1,690,685.30 This exclusion is innocuous and results
including these observations are virtually unchanged and not diﬀerent from results without
these observations.
24Cross sectional tax data from 2004 already includes all wage earners even when they did not ﬁle a tax
report. Now, employers have to report wage income of their employees electronically to the tax authorities,
but were not forced to in earlier years.
25This has two reasons: (1) only one person of the married couple keeps the individual taxpayer ID after
marriage or divorce and is consistent linkable. In most cases, this is the primary earner. (2) sometimes the
individual taxpayers IDs are newly created or changed and not consistently linkable.
26These weights allow to infer properties of the full balanced panel with the 19 million observations but
are not designed to make projection for the whole German population.
27The data starts in 2001, the regression model in section 4.2 does not permit earlier year pairs.
28One way to avoid that selection mechanism would be the calculation of arc-elasticities instead. This,
however, is not standard in the literature and I refrain from doing that.
29This is standard in the literature of taxable income and I assume that this exclusion is random and does
not correlate with income growth. Moreover, results conﬁrm that this selection is not crucial.
30Furthermore, a small group of taxpayers that are not fully taxable, because they do not live in Germany
for instance are excluded.
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4 Econometric Speciﬁcation
This section discusses the model by Gruber and Saez (2002) and compares it to an alternative
model introduced in this section.
4.1 Gruber and Saez
Gruber and Saez's (2002) model is a generalization of Auten and Carroll (1998). In this model
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from the base year Wit−1 to control for heterogeneity of taxpayers with coeﬃcient vector γ,31












+ ρ1ln(yit−1) + γWit−1 + c+ it (1)
it is the individual residual in period t and assumed to be independent of the control variables
Wit−1 and ln(yit−1) and uncorrelated over time. The literature widely recognizes that the net-
of-tax rate is endogenous for a progressive tax schedule and 2SLS regressions are applied.33
Gruber and Saez (2002) simulate an instrument based on the counterfactual growth rate of
the net-of-tax rate which is strongly correlated with the endogenous variable.34
Note that Gruber and Saez's (2002) assumption of uncorrelated residual over time in equation
(1) allows them to treat base year income yit−1 as exogenous and as source for the simulation
of the counterfactual net-of-tax rate.35 Appendix (7.1) presents a possible level equation of
Gruber and Saez's (2002) model that satisﬁes that assumption. However, the assumption
31See Table A.1 for a depiction of the control variables.
32Gruber and Saez (2002) modify this model by using 10 piece-wise linear splines of base year income
instead base year income.
33See Saez et al. (2012) for an interpretation of the endogeneity problem and diﬀerent potential solutions.
34This is done by deriving a counterfactual income for year t by inﬂating the individual base year income
yit−1 and computing tax rates using the tax schedule of year t. To avoid that taxpayers with the same
taxable income in the base year have the same counterfactual growth rate, incomes and taxable deductions
are inﬂated by diﬀerent growth rates. Income is inﬂated by using the GDP growth rate and individual
deductions are inﬂated by using the consumer price index.
35See Gruber and Saez (2002), page 10 ﬀ. with a detailed discussion of the potential endogeneity of base
year income. Gruber and Saez argue that using an appropriate functional form of base year income solves all
endogeneity problems and also controls for mean reversion. Growth rates of the inﬂation rate and the GDP
are obtained from the German federal statistical oﬃce and can be downloaded at https://www.destatis.
de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesamtwirtschaftUmwelt/VGR/Inlandsprodukt/Inlandsprodukt.html.
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of uncorrelated residuals over time is potentially violated in two cases: (1) if equation (1)
is nevertheless in ﬁrst diﬀerences and so are residuals which then follow a moving average
process of at least order one. Moreover, this also implies that base year income systematically
correlates with the residuals and would be endogenous. Weber (2014) shows in great detail
that the endogeneity of base year in equation (1) is inevitable if it follows from ﬁrst diﬀerences
and cannot be avoided using instruments based on the base year, regardless of additional
functional forms of the base year income controls.36 (2) if income follows an individual ﬁxed
eﬀect but equation (1) is not in ﬁrst diﬀerence, the ﬁxed eﬀect would be embedded in the
residuals which would then have signiﬁcant serial correlation and high correlation with base
year income.
4.2 An alternative approach
To introduce the alternative model, equation (2) presents the level equation of individual
income yit for period t. Income follows an individual ﬁxed eﬀect i, its own lag, base year
income yit−1 with elasticity ρ2, the net-of-tax rate 1 − τit with elasticity β, a linear time
trend t with coeﬃcient c and current demographic charactersWit with a vector of coeﬃcients
γ1. To allow for a dynamic inﬂuence of demographic characteristics, income also follows Wit
interacted with the time trend t and coeﬃcient vector γ2.
37
ln(yit) = i+ βln(1− τit) + ρ2ln(yit−1) + γ1Wit + t · (c+ γ2Wit) + it38 (2)
it is the individual residual in period t and assumed to be independent of the control variables
in Wit and ln(yit−1) and uncorrelated over time.

















+ (γ1 + tγ2)∆Wit + c+ γ2Wit−1 + ∆it (3)
36To overcome this, Weber (2014) proposes the usage of higher lags of base year income as source for the
instruments. Weber's (2014) speciﬁcation includes income controls from the ﬁrst and second lag of base year
income.
37Including a dynamic inﬂuence of demographic characteristics controls for heterogeneous income growth
and increases comparability between the alternative model and the Gruber and Saez's 2002 model from
equation (1).
38This model is a special case of the model of Holmlund and Söderström (2011) if γ2 is zero. Their model
also includes the lagged net-of-tax rate and the demographic control variables from period t and period t−1.
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Now, the growth rate of the net-of-tax rate and the lagged income growth correlate system-
atically with it−1 and are endogenous.
Equation (3) estimates income growth in several aspects diﬀerently than Gruber and Saez's
(2002) equation (1) does. First, equation (3) depends on the endogenous lagged income
growth instead of the assumed exogenous base year income. Second, residuals in equation
(3) follow a moving average process of order one instead of residuals assumed to be only from
period t. Third, due to the endogeneity of base year income, a higher lag of base year income
is used as sources for the counterfactual income and as instrument.39
5 Results
Note: the data I use is not a random draw, but a 5% stratiﬁed sample (see section 3 for a
description). To control for the non-random properties of the data, results in this section are
estimated with the stratiﬁcation criteria as control variables.40 Results are computed on a
constant deﬁnition of taxable income, based on the tax law from 2001.41 This section presents
results according to the modeling section, starting with results for Gruber and Saez's (2002)
model from equation (1) presented in Table 2. Subsequently follow results for the alternative
model from equation (3) presented in Table 3 including an extensive sensitivity analysis of
the model in Table 4.
In Table 1, some mean values and standard deviations (in brackets) of the sample are pre-
sented. The table is divided into two panels, the left panel shows average values for the sample
without weighting factors, the right panel presents average values for weighted observations.
Taxable income is very high in the unweighted sample with an average of 141,706 Euro and
weighted clearly smaller with an average of 43,854, which reﬂects the strong over-sampling
39Instruments for the net-of-tax growth rate are computed analog to the procedure by Gruber and Saez
(2002) introduced in the previous subsection. Source for the counterfactual net-of-growth rates are the lagged
individual base year income yit−2 and the second lag of base year income yit−3. The instruments for the







40See Solon et al. (2013) for an extensive discussion about estimating causal eﬀects in non random sample
and an evaluation of the usage of sample weights.
41All changes of the deﬁnition of taxable income between 2002 and 2006 are corrected as long as the data
allows for a consistent correction. This includes annual child allowances which were increased from 2556 Euro
per year and child to 2904 Euro per year and child, allowed expenses for non-itemizing employees which were
reduced from 1044 Euro to 920 Euro, allowances for single parents which were cut from 2871 Euro to 1308
Euro and capital gain exemptions which were reduced from 1550 Euro to 1370 Euro per year. I assume that
these changes only induce mechanical reactions and do not aﬀect the measured elasticity of taxable income.
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of the high taxpayers. Average values for the income growth, average tax rate the net-of-tax
rates are also smaller for the weighted observations. The average age of the taxpayer is 47,
61% are married, 2.4% of taxpayers have newborn children and 0.4% change their residency
from one federal state to another.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Unweighted Weighted
Mean Mean
(Std. Deviation) (Std. Deviation)
(1) (2)
Taxable income 141706 43854
(948274) (204818)
Average tax rate .365 .311
(.088) (.069)
Income growth .035 .015
(.397) (.247 )
Net-of-Tax Rate .023 .012
(.063) (.049)
Counterfactual Net-of-Tax Rate Based on yit−1 .022 .010
(.029) (.019 )
Counterfactual Net-of-Tax Rate Based on yit−2 .019 .010
(.031) (.020)





Married Dummy .67 .61
(.473) (.489)
New Child Dummy .023 .024
(.163) (.162)
Change of State Dummy .024 .004
.058 (.066)
Number of observations 1,690,685 37,100,000
Source: Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006.
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5.1 Regression results
Results in Table 2 are from 2SLS regression and serve as comparison results based on Gruber
and Saez`s (2002) model from equation (1). All models include further control variables for
the stratiﬁcation criteria (strat. controls) and demographic variables (demo. controls).42
Table 2 consists of ﬁve columns, with the ﬁrst three columns reproducing Gruber and Saez's
(2002) model with base year income as income control and as source for the counterfactual
net-of-tax rate. As argued in the previous section, base year income is likely to be endogenous,
thus column (4) and (5) use lagged base year income as source for the counterfactual net-of-
tax rate and lagged base year income as control.43 Column (1) estimates the equation with
2SLS without income control, column (2) and (4) use the log of income control and column
(3) and (5) use 10 piece linear splines of the income control. Results for OLS are presented
in Table A.3 of Appendix 7.4.2. The estimated ETI is very sensitive to the inclusion of the
income controls. Results in column (1) are without income control and the estimated ETI is
negative and large with -0.77. Including base year income as control variable increases the
ETI signiﬁcantly to 1.23 in column (2) and using 10 linear splines of base year income reduces
the ETI to 0.46 in column (3).44 Using lagged base year income and according instruments
in column (4) results in an ETI of 0.91 and using splines also reduces the ETI signiﬁcantly
to 0.70 in column (5).
42Demographic control variables are age, age squared, young and old dummies, taxpayer moving the federal
state (Bundesland), taxpayer with newborn children, two earner taxpayers, handy-capped taxpayers, single
parents taxpayers, and retired taxpayers. Variables controlling for the stratiﬁcation are income from the ﬁrst
year of the data and dummies for joint tax ﬁling and for tax code related main income source. Additionally
all regressions include time dummies. See Table A.1 for a detailed description.
43These speciﬁcations are also conducted in Weber (2014).
44This is not unusual in the literature. Gruber and Saez 2002 obtain an ETI -0.462 without income control,
of 0.611 with log of base year income and an ETI 0.4 with splines. Müller (2012) and Schmidt estimate for
Germany an ETI of -0.189 without income control, 0.99 with the lagged income growth rate and the log of
the lag of base year, and 0.32 with splines.
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Table 2: Results for estimating the ETI from equation (1)
Instruments based on t− 1 Instruments based on t− 2
and t− 3






-0.748*** 1.237*** 0.460*** 0.909*** 0.701***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
ln (yit−1) -0.145*** 10 Piece
(0.00) -Spline
ln (yit−2) -0.041*** 10 Piece
(0.00) -Spline
D new child -0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D change of state 0.082*** 0.087*** 0.083*** 0.102*** 0.093***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
D marriage 0.031*** 0.100*** 0.080*** 0.057*** 0.055***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income 2001 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Strat. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tests of weak Instruments
First stage F-Statistic 262353 43299 38988 20087 16959
Partial R2 .134 .071 .065 .038 .032
Test of Moving Average
Arellano-Bond test, order 1 -265 -187 -93 -107 -105
(p value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Arellano-Bond test, order 2 -20 31 -11 -3.07 -5.33
(p value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) ( 0.002) (0.000)
Number of Observations 1690685 1690685 1690685 1690685 1690685
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All regressions include a constant and year dummies.
Sample control variable are dummy variables for main income source and dummy controls for the level
of income in 2001. Age control variables are the taxpayers age, age squared, a dummy for taxpayers
over 55 and a dummy for taxpayers younger than 21 in 2001. Demographic control variables are
dummy variables for single parents, handicapped taxpayers, two earner taxpayers, retired taxpayers
and non-taxable income. Partial R2 is the partial R-squared for the growth rate of the net-of-tax
rate, see Shea (1997) and Godfrey (1999) for a description. The Arellano-Bond tests for ﬁrst-order
and second-order of moving average is asymptotically N(0,1) distributed.
Source:Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006.
Results of the F-statistic and the partial R2 conﬁrm that instruments in the ﬁrst stage are
strong in all regressions and the weak instrument problem is not a threat. The F-statistics
are very high with values above 10,000 in all speciﬁcations and the partial R2 is high in
all columns but (5).45 However, the Arellano-Bond tests of moving average reject the null
45The F-statistic and the partial R2 are the two most common used criteria for assessing the instrumental
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hypothesis of no serial correlation for the ﬁrst and for the second order. The Arellano-Bond
test is asymptotic standard normal N(0,1) distributed, test values exceed critical values at
all signiﬁcance levels and p values are 0 in all speciﬁcations.46 This conﬁrms, for the German
case, that neither base year income nor lagged base year income are exogenous and valid
income controls for a model of type equation (1). Moreover, these results indicate that stan-
dard tests of instrumental validity such as the Sargan Test (1958) are potentially misleading
if instruments are based on lagged dependent variables.47
Table 3 reports 2SLS regression results for the regression model in equation (3). Column (1)
shows results for a restricted income growth model, setting the inﬂuence of lagged income to
zero ρ2 = 0
48, column (2) allows ρ2 to diﬀer from zero and is the benchmark result that follows
directly from equation (3). Column (3) is a sensitivity check estimating equation (3) only with
a subset of control variables, column (4) adds a selection control following Heckman (1979)
using Wit−1 and indicator variables from the ﬁrst year of the panel as exclusion restrictions,
columns (5) and (6) are a reproduction of the benchmark equation but without taxpayers
with the highest 1% incomes in (5) and without taxpayers with base year income below
10,000 Euro in (6). The ETI in the restricted speciﬁcation in column (1) is relatively small
with 0.03 and insigniﬁcant but positive. First stage results suggest that the 2SLS estimation
is not likely to suﬀer from a weak instrument problem and instruments for the net-of-tax rate
are strongly correlated, conﬁrmed by the partial R2 of 0.065 and the F-statistic of 59,230.
strength in single endogenous models. Critical values of the F-test statistic are around 20 depending on the
size and power of the test, see Stock and Yogo (2002) for a derivation of critical test values. However, the
F-statistic can be misleading in large samples. The F-statistic measures the reduction in the sum of squared
residuals (RSS) when adding the instruments and increasing the number of explanatory variables. With
increasing sample size, this statistic could become signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero even for weak instruments.
In contrast, the partial R2 is independent of sample size and measures the additional explained variance of
the instruments on the endogenous variable, see Shea (1996) and Godfrey (1999) for an introduction to the
measure.
46See Arellano and Bond (1991) for an introduction of the test.
47Weber (2014) proposes the use of the Sargan Test to test for endogeneity of the instrument based on
base year. However, the Sargan Test is conditional on the validity of the other instruments, which would be
problematic if the other instruments are based on higher lags of base year income and residuals have a high
persistence in the residual autocorrelation structure.
48This speciﬁcation corresponds to a level equation of income independently of lagged income and equals
the benchmark model from Weber (2014).
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Table 3: Results for estimating the ETI from equation (3)






0.032 0.364*** 0.307*** 0.340*** 0.362*** 0.561***






0.117*** 0.116*** 0.088*** 0.121*** 0.076***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D new child 0.014*** -0.003 0.016*** 0.015*** -0.003 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D change of state 0.122*** 0.091*** 0.109*** 0.105*** 0.091*** 0.060***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
D marriage -0.001* 0.039*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.040*** 0.042***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income 2001 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
λ 0.026***
(0.00)
Strat. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tests of weak Instruments
First stage F-Statistic 59230 18890 19088 19700 18367 20418
Partial R21 .065 .055 .056 .057 .053 .059
Partial R22 .154 .147 .084 .164 .173
Tests of Moving Average
Arellano-Bond test, order 1 -223 -165 -159 -126 -166 -155
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Arellano-Bond test, order 2 -15 -0.93 2.65 -0.360 -0.379 -4.67
(p-value) (0.000) (0.353) (0.008) (0.69) (0.718) (0.000)
Number of Observations 1690685 1690685 1690685 1690685 1668493 1616385
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All regressions include a constant and year dummies. Sample
control variable are dummy variables for main income source and dummy variables for the level of income
in 2001. Age control variables are the taxpayers age, age squared, a dummy for taxpayers over 55 and a
dummy for taxpayers younger than 21 in 2001. Age control variables in 1, 2, 5 and 6 are the full set with the
taxpayers age, age squared, a dummy for taxpayers over 55 and a dummy for taxpayers younger than 21 in
2001. The ﬁrst diﬀerence of those control variables are included in 3 and 4. Demographic control variables
are dummy variables for single parents, handicapped taxpayers, two earner taxpayers, retired taxpayers and
non-taxable income. λ denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the Heckman sample selection model. The ﬁrst
stage F-Statistic is the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic with critical values of 11.04 for 5% relative IV bias
and 16.87 for 10% IV size, source Stock and Yogo (2005). Partial R21 is the partial R-squared for the growth
rate of the net-of-tax rate, Partial R22 is the partial R-squared for the lagged income growth, see Shea (1997)
and Godfrey (1999) for a description. The Arellano-Bond tests for ﬁrst-order and second-order of moving
average is asymptotically N(0,1) distributed.
Source:Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006.
However estimates from this restricted model in column (1) have to be viewed with caution.
The Arellano-Bond tests of moving average reveal signiﬁcant negative ﬁrst- and negative
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second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. This implies potential model misspeciﬁcation
which could be induced by restricting the inﬂuence of lagged income zero.
Including lagged income growth in column (2) increases the estimated ETI to 0.36, with a
positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the lagged income growth with 0.12. Note that equa-
tion (3) contains more than one endogenous variable once lagged income growth is included,
increasing the number of endogenous variables to two. In the case of multiple endogenous
variables both Shea's partial R2 and the standard F-statistic can be problematic when assess-
ing the instrumental validity.49 The Cragg-Donald F-test can be used in the case of multiple
endogenous variables to test if the instruments strongly correlate with the endogenous vari-
ables.50 Checking nevertheless ﬁrst stage statistics, show high partial R2s of 0.055 and 0.154
and a large F-statistic with 18,890. Table A.2 presents further descriptive results for the in-
strumented net-of-tax rate and compares them to descriptive results for the net-of-tax rate.
The ﬁrst order moving average test is signiﬁcant and negative, but the second order with a
p-value of 0.35 is insigniﬁcant at any conventional signiﬁcance levels.51
Column (3) is a robustness check restricting lagged demographic variables of equation (3) to
zero by setting γ2 = 0. Thus, now control variables are only included in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
52
Column (3) shows that demographic control variables have little inﬂuence on the measured
ETI and the lagged income growth. Both are only slightly smaller with an ETI of 0.31 and
lagged income elasticity of 0.12. First stage results change only little with partial R2s of
0.056 and 0.146 and the F-statistic of 19,080.
As described in section (3), results are based on a selective sub-sample of taxpayers. Ar-
guably the most crucial selection is that only taxpayers with taxable income exceeding the
basic allowance in base year t − 1 and year t are included. This serves two purposes: it
excludes taxpayers with marginal tax rates equal zero in t or t− 1 and it excludes taxpayers
with potential high mean reversion unrelated to the tax reform. However, that non-random
49Valid IV estimation needs at least as many instruments as endogenous variables. However, both the
F-statistic and the partial R2 are estimated for joint validity of all instruments and will have high test values
once at least one of the instruments is strong, even when the other is not.
50The Cragg-Donald F-test is equal to the F-test in the case of one endogenous variable. The test uses
canonical correlations, testing the smallest canonical correlation between the set of instruments and the set
of endogenous variables.
51This is consistent with residuals uncorrelated over time in the level equation (2).
52However, most models in the literature of the elasticity of taxable income use demographic variables to
control for the heterogeneity between diﬀerent types of taxpayers. Excluding the demographics reduces the
comparability to Gruber and Saez's (2002) model in equation (1). See Table A.1 for a description of all
control variables.
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selection might bias the estimation result of the elasticity.
Column (4) demonstrates the eﬀect of controlling for the non-random selection by including
the inverse Mills ratio λ from a Heckman selection control estimation.53 The inverse Mills
ratio is small but signiﬁcant with an estimate of 0.03. However, including the selection
control does not have a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the estimated ETI with 0.34. That
estimate is not diﬀerent from the estimated ETI in column (2) with 0.36 and the elasticity in
column (3) with 0.31. Hence, I assume that results are not source to a selection bias and the
alternative model from equation (3) in column (2) is consistently estimated for the German
case.
Bach et al. (2009) document that top incomes in Germany had dramatic income increase
by partially more than 50% between 2001 and 2005. Moreover, there is a large literature
estimating income responses to taxation only for the top incomes (see Saez et al. 2102).
This is motivated by two aspects of taxpayers with high incomes: (1) a special interest in the
responses of the group of taxpayers paying the most taxes54, (2) taxpayers at the top might
substantially diﬀer from the remaining taxpayers which might be hard to control in this type
of model. To control for the inﬂuence of top incomes in an easy way, results in column (5)
are estimated on a sub-sample that excludes taxpayers who belong to the top 1% of taxable
income which excludes 22,192 observations. Results are not sensitive to this selection and
are virtually unchanged with an ETI of 0.36 and the lagged income growth of 0.12.55
Most studies of the elasticity of taxable income literature exclude the lowest incomes from
their sample.56
As a robustness check in column (6), I employ a strong selection on lower incomes and
53See Heckman (1978) for an introduction to the model. To compute the selection control λ, the selection
equation needs so employ valid and strong exclusion restrictions. I use the demographic control variables also
excluded in column (3) as exclusion restrictions in column (4). Furthermore I produce indicator variables
from the ﬁrst year of the panel: (1) Indicator for the number of diﬀerent income sources, (2) the variance
of the incomes between the income sources and (3) an indicator for negative incomes are used as exclusion
restrictions.
54Note that the German income tax schedule arrives at the top marginal tax rate at a taxable income of
approximately 52,000 Euro. The top 10% of incomes in Germany, however, have already an average annual
income of 83,400 Euro between 1992 and 2001 (see Bach et al. 2009). Calculating an ETI just for top incomes
in Germany with my data would suﬀer from very low variation and most incomes would face the same tax
rate change and the ETI would simply be a constant.
55Excluding only taxpayers with top 0.1% of taxable income gives even more similar results.
56This has two reasons. One reason is that mean reversion is supposed to be strongest at the lower end
of the income distribution. Another reason is that most recent tax reforms lowered the tax rate for the top
incomes but kept tax rates for the lower and middle part of the distribution constant. Dropping the lowest
part of the sample, serves then comparability between the treatment and the control group in the sense of a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation.
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exclude taxpayers with base year income below 10,000 Euro. This reduces the number of
observations by 74,300 to 1,616,385.57 Results for the ETI and the lagged income growth
change signiﬁcantly: the ETI is now 0.56 and the lagged income growth decreases to 0.08.
This raises some doubt about appropriateness of this strong selection and suggests that this
result is driven by selection bias.
This strong selection is copied from another recent study for Germany by Müller and Schmidt
(2012). Their results are remarkably similar to my benchmark results with an ETI of 0.32.
However, when applying their selection criteria, my results diﬀer severely. Müller and Schmidt
(2012) diﬀer from this study in four other aspects: (1) the authors employ the speciﬁcation
by Kopczuk (2005), an approach based on the Gruber and Saez (2002) model. Thus, their
results might suﬀer from serial correlation, which the authors also acknowledge but do not
provide test results to support their model. (2) The authors estimate the model on the
popular three years lag basis, which however potentially induces serial correlation of a higher
order. (3) Following Gruber and Saez (2002), the authors only report weighted regression
results.58
Comparing my results for Germany with results from the US is challenging due to the wide
range of results, with values between 0.12 and 1 (see Saez et al. 2012).
A recent study by Weber (2014) estimates high values of ETI for the US with an approach
similar to my model.59 Weber's baseline result for the elasticity of taxable income is 0.86,
thus more than twice the size of the German ETI. This could be related to the fact that the
German welfare state is generally more redistributive than the US welfare state. It would be
interesting to compare US results to the German results for an income elasticity to a joint
measure of taxes, transfers and social security contributions. Transfers and social securities
are especially high at the lower end of the German income distribution, including transfer
withdrawal rates of 80 and 90%, with implicit marginal tax rates near one. Such an income
elasticity would have a pronounced relevance on the governmental budget and extents the
picture from tax revenue to tax-transfer revenue.60
The following Table 4 presents 2SLS result for further sensitivity checks of the benchmark
57Despite including a potential selection bias with this exclusion of the lowest taxpayers, this also excludes
the group of taxpayers with the highest tax rate changes, see Figure 2.
58This might produce inconsistent results when one tries to estimate causal eﬀects, see Solon et al. (2012)
for an extensive discussion about weighting factors in regressions.
59Section 7.2 in the Appendix presents Weber's (2014) model and results from column (1) correspond to
Weber's baseline model.
60See a similar approach by Bartels (2013) computing long-term participation tax rates for Germany and
their inﬂuence on work incentives.
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result from the alternative model of equation (3) in two dimensions, one is the usage of a
non-linear income control with 10 linear piece splines, the second is the separation of the
elasticity of taxable income for married and for single taxpayers. Column (1) of Table 4 is
a reproduction of column (2) of Table 3 and is the benchmark result with an elasticity of
taxable income of 0.36. Column (2) uses a non-linear function of the lagged income growth
with a 10 piecewise linear splines.61 Gruber and Saez (2002) were the ﬁrst in the literature of
taxable income elasticity to use splines as non-linear income control and its usage has become
popular in most papers.62 The ETI in column (2), including the non-linear income splines, is
0.44 with high standard errors of 0.06 and is not statistically diﬀerent from the benchmark
elasticity with 0.36. However, using splines on lagged income growth in the alternative model
of equation (3) increases the number of endogenous variables to 11.63 First stage statistics
raise concern about a weak instrument problem which questions the liability of results in
column (2): the F-statistic has a value of 1 which is very low for 11 endogenous variables
and 1,690,685 observations.
61Break points and distribution of the splines are based on the lagged income growth using the Stata
command mkspline.
62See for instance Weber (2014), Heim (2009), Kopczuk (2005) and Giertz (2007) using 10 piecewise linear
splines of income controls in their estimations.
63Instruments for the 10 splines are the 10 linear splines of the second lagged income growth.
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Table 4: Sensitivity results for estimating the ETI from equation (3)





























0.117*** 10 Piece 0.114*** 0.119*** 0.074***
(0.00) -Spline (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D new child -0.003 0.009 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D change of state 0.091*** 0.157*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.058***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
D marriage 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.037***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income 2001 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Strat controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tests of weak Instruments
First stage F-Statistic 18890 1.01 11960 11587 12897
Partial R21 0.055
Partial R211 0.07 0.068 0.074
Partial R212 0.082 0.080 0.086
Partial R22 0.154 0.150 0.161 0.170
Tests of Moving Average
Arellano-Bond test, order 1 -165 -14 -162 -163 -153
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Arellano-Bond test, order 2 -0.93 1.92 -1.10 -0.536 -4.82
(p-value) (0.353) (0.054) (0.273) (0.592) (0.000)
Number of Observations 1690685 1690685 1690685 1668493 1616385
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All regressions include a constant and year dummies.
Sample control variable are dummy variables for main income source and dummy variables for
the level of income in 2001. Age control variables are the taxpayers age, age squared, a dummy
for taxpayers over 55 and a dummy for taxpayers younger than 21 in 2001. Age control variables
are the taxpayers age, age squared, a dummy for taxpayers over 55 and a dummy for taxpayers
younger than 21 in 2001. Demographic control variables are dummy variables for single parents,
handicapped taxpayers, two earner taxpayers, retired taxpayers and non-taxable income. The
ﬁrst stage F-Statistic is the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic with critical values of see Stock
and Yogo (2005). Partial R21 is the partial R-squared for the growth rate of the net-of-tax
rate. Partial R211 is the partial R-squared for the growth rate of the net-of-tax rate for single
taxpayers, Partial R211 is the partial R-squared for the growth rate of married taxpayers. Partial
R22 is the partial R-squared for the lagged income growth, see Shea (1997) and Godfrey (1999)
for a description.
For sake of brevity, no partial R-squared for speciﬁcation (2) and (3) are reported as the number
of endogenous variables increases to 6, respectively 11. The Arellano-Bond tests for ﬁrst-order
and second-order of moving average is asymptotically N(0,1) distributed.
Source:Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006.
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The German tax law discriminates heavily between married and single taxpayers. Married
taxpayers can opt for the splitting tax schedule to decrease their joint taxation and marginal
tax rates. Results in columns (3), (4) and (5) interact the marriage dummy with the growth
rate of the net-of-tax rate to allow diﬀerent elasticities for single and married taxpayers.
Separating elasticities is common practice in micro-econometric analysis, for instance, in the
labor supply elasticity literature.64 Column (3) is the interaction for the whole sample with
1,690,685 observations and shows that the ETI for single taxpayers is 0.17 and signiﬁcantly
smaller than the ETI for married taxpayers with 0.44. The ETI of married taxpayers exceeds
the elasticity of single taxpayers by 0.27, which supports separate estimations. This reﬂects
the higher tax-planing potential of married taxpayers and could be related to the opportunity
of inter-personal transfers and diﬀerent utility functions of the married. The coeﬃcients of
the control variables and the lagged income growth are virtually unchanged. First stage
statistics are high with a F-statistic of 11960 and partial R2s above 5%.65 Column (4) and
(5) are results from the selective samples and serve as comparison to the results from column
(3). Results in column (4) show that the separated elasticities of married and single taxpayers
are not sensitive to the exclusion of the top 1% taxable income. The elasticity for the married
is 0.44 and the elasticity for single taxpayers is 0.17. Results are not statistically diﬀerent
from the results of the full sample in (3) and ﬁrst stage statistics indicate strong instruments.
Column (5) shows the reproduction of the selection of column (6) from Table 3 for the
separation of the ETI for married and single taxpayers by deleting taxpayers with taxable
income below the 10,000 Euro in the base year t − 1. The ETIs are again signiﬁcantly
higher than in the benchmark results in column (3) with an elasticity of 0.62 for married
taxpayers and an elasticity of 0.41 for single taxpayers. These estimates conﬁrm the evidence
for selection bias that is caused by the the income cut oﬀ at the lower end of the income
distribution.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides new insights for the elasticity of taxable income for Germany. Results
are based on a rich and unique German panel data for six straight years from 2001 to 2006.
That data over-samples high incomes and comprises two major reforms in 2004 and 2005
64Bargain et. al (2012) provide a survey of recent labor supply elasticities for 17 European countries and
the US. The estimation and results of labor supply elasticities are divided for single and couple households.
65The number of endogenous variables increases to three through the interaction with the marriage dummy,
all instruments for the growth rate of net-of-tax are interacted accordingly.
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that were part of a bundle of reforms, the so called Agenda 2010. The tax reforms induced
substantial exogenous variation on personal income taxation along the whole income distri-
bution. Marginal and average tax rates were lowered for the whole income distribution, with
biggest reductions at the lower and top end of the tax bracket.
The elasticity of taxable income is of particular interest for assessing tax revenue changes
from tax reforms. The current paper proposes an alternative model to measure the elasticity
of taxable income which avoids potential pitfalls of models from the literature. Beginning
with an introduction of the most prominent model in the literature by Gruber and Saez
(2002) in equation (1), the paper argues that results from this model might be biased in the
case of residuals with signiﬁcant serial correlation. For the case that Gruber and Saez' (2002)
model suﬀers from serial correlation, an alternative model, that delivers un-biased estimates,
is introduced in equation (3).
The Gruber and Saez (2002) model from equation (1) estimates an ETI of 0.46 for Germany.
However, tests of residuals suggest signiﬁcant serial correlation in equation (1) and the esti-
mates suﬀer from a remaining endogeneity problem. Estimating the alternative model from
equation (3) suggests an ETI of 0.36 for Germany. Tests of residual serial correlation show
that results are consistent and do not suﬀer from a weak instrument problem. Results for
the ETI are very robust against a number of sensitivity checks: excluding the top 1% taxable
incomes, the amount of control variables and non-linear income controls.
My result for the ETI of 0.36 is remarkably similar to results from a recent study by Müller
and Schmidt (2012). Which is surprising, since Müller and Schmidt (2012) diﬀer in various
important aspects from my study. However, when I reproduce their sample selection, my
result for the ETI increases signiﬁcantly to 0.56. This questions the validity of that selection
and supports the presence of a selection bias in their results. Accounting for the heavy tax
favoring of married taxpayers compared to single taxpayers, the elasticity of taxable income
is also estimated separately for both types of taxpayers. Married taxpayers have a larger
ETI of 0.44 than single taxpayers with 0.17. The diﬀerence of the ETI between the married
and single is robust against the exclusion of the top 1% taxable incomes or exclusion of low
taxable incomes.
The ETI for Germany with 0.36 is signiﬁcantly lower than recent results for the USA from
Weber (2014). Employing a model similar the alternative model from equation (3), Weber
ﬁnds an ETI of 0.86 which exceeds my result by 0.5.
This paper provides reactions to the change of taxation for an income concept that is deﬁned
by the tax code. Employing the same model for a more general income concept like some
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gross income concept would be fruitful and add another perspective of behavioral responses
to taxation for future research. Moreover, this is common practice in the literature, for in-
stance, Gruber and Saez (2002) ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant elasticity of broad income to changes in
taxation.
Another aspect of future research would be the inclusion of transfer withdrawal rates. The
German welfare state is very redistributive and provides signiﬁcant income insurance. This
induces very high transfer withdrawal rates for low incomes of 80 and 90% and implicit
marginal tax rates near one. An elasticity of taxable and transfer income would be worth-
while to estimate and compare it to the elasticity of taxable income. Unfortunately, German
tax data are not as representative for lower incomes than they are for top incomes and do
not allow to derive the full household context necessary to compute transfers. Survey panel
data like the SOEP are very representative at the lower end of the income distribution and
allow to include the household context of taxpayers.66 This comes with the price of of low
representativity of top incomes. Matching both data sources would be an obvious instrument
to capture the entire German income distribution. Conﬁdentiality restrictions, however, do
not allow to combine the data and use it as one. Furthermore, in 2006/07, the marginal
top tax rate was increase again to 45%, while the remaining tax schedule was unchanged.
Employing model (3) on data for the years until 2007 would be an interesting and important
result since taxpayers with top incomes contribute the most tax revenue in Germany.
7 Appendix
7.1 The Level Equation of Gruber and Saez (2002)
An underlying level equation to Gruber and Saez's (2002) model, in which residuals are not






+ (1 + ρ1)ln (yit−1) + γWit−1 + c+ it (4)
Since residuals are not in ﬁrst diﬀerence and do not follow a moving average process, base
year income is exogenous and a valid control and valid source for the instrument. However,
note two things about this model: ﬁrst, income follows its own lag with coeﬃcient (1 + ρ1)
66A promising opportunity of the SOEP would be usage of the tax and transfer simulation model STSM
provided by DIW, see Steiner et al. (2012) for a documentation of the STSM.
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and second, the elasticity of taxable income, β, depends on the growth rate of the net-of-tax
rate rather than on the net-of tax rate.67
7.2 Weber's (2014) model
A recent model by Weber (2014) is based on the decomposition of individual income of
period t yit into a permanent µi, transitory ηit and an income component that depends on
the net-of-tax rate (1− τit) with elasticity β:
ln(yit) = βln(1− τit) + ln(µi) + ln(ηit) (5)













Weber (2014) estimates this equation also with additional control variables including lagged
base year income, or splines of lagged base year income. Weber (2014) discusses the serial
correlation of the transitory income in great detail and tests instrumental validity with the
help of over-identifying restrictions. Since base year income yit−1 systematically correlates
with the ∆ln(ηit), it is endogenous and is not a valid instrument. Weber (2014) uses the
Sargan Test (1958) to show the endogeneity of instruments created from base year income.
Over-identifying restrictions are drawn from instruments based on higher lags of base year
income. However, this is potentially problematic if higher lags of base year income also
correlate with ∆ln(ηit). This would be the case if, for instance, transitory income follows a
moving average of order one. Then the ﬁrst diﬀerence of transitory income also systematically
correlates with the lag of base year income yit−2 through ηit−2:










with θ1 as the coeﬃcient of persistence of the transitory income and ςit and ςit−1 as uncorre-
lated innovations. Once θ1 is of considerable size, also other higher lags of base year income
would correlate with the residuals and be endogenous.
67 Gruber and Saez (2002) derive the elasticity of taxable income from a consumption model and result to
an estimation question quite diﬀerent from this.
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A simple way to avoid this endogeneity problem is by using the lagged income growth as




























and lagged base year income yit−2 is not
endogenous anymore and a valid instrument. This speciﬁcation corresponds to my alternative
model from equation (3).68
7.3 Control variables
A detailed description of construction of the sample is available upon request.69
7.4 More Results
7.4.1 Descriptive Results for the Instrumentation
Table A.2 shows results for the instrumentation of the net-of-tax rate in the alternative
model (3). The descriptive results for the whole sample in the top block show that the
instrumentation results to a signiﬁcantly smaller variance in the instrumented net-of-tax rate
than in the initial true net-of-tax rate. The middle block, however, shows that the variation
of the net-of-tax rate and its instrumented version is much similar, once the top 1% and
the lowest 1% of the net-of-tax rate are excluded. Furthermore, excluding the top 5% an
lowest 5% of the net-of-tax rate in the lowest block shows that the instrumentation produces
a similar variation of the instrumented net-of-tax rate then the true net-of-tax rate, and
deviations in the top block are mainly driven from outliers.
68This special case of Weber's (2014) model diﬀers from equation (3) regarding the control variables, which
however could easily be adjusted.
69Business activity includes taxable income from agriculture and forestry, from unincorporated business














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.2: Instrumentation based on alternative model (3)
Growth rate of Growth rate of
Net-of-tax rate Instrumented
Net-of-tax rate
All Mean .023 .023
Std .063 .028
N 1690685 1690685
p(99)< and >P(1) Mean .023 .023
Std .049 .028
N 1656871 1656871
p(95)< and >P(5) Mean .023 .023
Std .035 .028
N 1521616 1521616
Source: Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-
2006.
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7.4.2 Results from OLS
Table A.3: Comparing OLS with 2SLS







-4.668*** -4.655*** 0.307*** 0.364***






-0.076*** -0.080*** 0.116*** 0.117***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.00)
D new child 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.016*** -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D change of state 0.010** 0.008* 0.109*** 0.091***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
D marriage -0.004*** 0.011*** 0.003*** 0.039***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income 2001 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Strat. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes
Tests of weak Instruments
First stage F-Statistic 19088 18890
Partial R21 .056 .0548
Partial R22 .147 .154
Tests of Moving Average
Arellano-Bond test, order 1 -159 -164.6
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000)
Arellano-Bond test, order 2 2.65 -0.929
(p-value) (0.008) (0.353)
Number of Observations 1690685 1690685 1690685 1690685
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All regressions include a constant and year dummies. Sample
control variable are dummy variables for main income source and dummy variables for the level of income in
2001. Age control variables are the taxpayers age, age squared, a dummy for taxpayers over 55 and a dummy
for taxpayers younger than 21 in 2001. Age control variables are the taxpayers age, age squared, a dummy
for taxpayers over 55 and a dummy for taxpayers younger than 21 in 2001. Demographic control variables
are dummy variables for single parents, handicapped taxpayers, two earner taxpayers, retired taxpayers and
non-taxable income. λ denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the Heckman sample selection model. The ﬁrst
stage F-Statistic is the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic with critical values of 11.04 for 5% relative IV bias
and 16.87 for 10% IV size, source Stock and Yogo (2005). Partial R21 is the partial R-squared for the growth
rate of the net-of-tax rate, Partial R22 is the partial R-squared for the lagged income growth, see Shea (1997)
and Godfrey (1999) for a description. The Arellano-Bond tests for ﬁrst-order and second-order of moving
average is asymptotically N(0,1) distributed.
Source:Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006.
Table A.3 presents results from OLS and reproduces results from 2SLS. Column (1) and
(2) are OLS results for the elasticity of taxable income, column (3) and (4) reproduces
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results from the alternative model from equation (3) from Table 3. Comparing results for
the elasticity of taxable income reveals the strong diﬀerences of the estimates: OLS results
are very large negative with -4.67 and -4.66, depending on the amount of control variables.
Hausman-Wu Tests (not reported) strongly indicate that the net-of-tax rate is endogenous
and the OLS estimates are diﬀerent from 2SLS results. The large negative correlation is as
expected and is oﬀspring to the progressive tax schedule which decreases the net-of-tax rate
for increasing income.
Results for the lagged income growth are also very diﬀerent for OLS in column (1) and (2)
with -0.08 from 2SLS with 0.12.
7.4.3 Results with restricted sets of control variables
Results in Table A.4 of equation (3) are with very restricted sets of control variables. The






Results show very small ETI in all speciﬁcation with a small but signiﬁcant ETI of 0.06 in
the most restrictive speciﬁcation without control variables in column (1). Including control
variables in column (2) and (3) results to an insigniﬁcant ETI of 0.032 in column (2) and a
signiﬁcant ETI of 0.06 in column (3). All results without lagged income growth need to be
viewed with caution. Results for the tests of serial correlation cannot reject a moving average
of at least order 2 which raises questions about the exogeneity of the employed instruments.70
The right block of Table A.4 shows results for equation (3) including lagged income growth
without control variables in column (4), with reduced amount of control variables in column
(5) and with the full set of control variable corresponding to the full model from equation
(3) in column (6). Estimates for the ETI are positive in all speciﬁcations and increase
with increasing extent of control variables. First stage statistics are high in all speciﬁcations,
especially in column (4) with an ETI of 0.22. Including control variables from ﬁrst diﬀerences
and stratiﬁcation control in column (5) presents a higher ETI of 0.31. Including all control
variables in column (6) deliver an ETI of 0.36 with residuals that have no serial correlation
of order 2 which corresponds to uncorrelated residuals in the level equation of the model in
equation (2).
70Instruments are counterfactual net-of-tax growth rates based on lagged base year income and the second
lag of base year income. If those lags of base year income are still signiﬁcantly correlated with the residuals,
estimates of the ETI are biased. My data comprise only six years and do not allow to include higher lags of
base year income for computation of additional and alternative counterfactual net-of-tax rates.
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Table A.4: Results for variation of controls






0.058*** 0.032 0.062** 0.219*** 0.307*** 0.364***








D new child 0.014*** -0.004* 0.016*** -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
D change of state 0.122*** 0.099*** 0.109*** 0.091***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
D marriage -0.001* 0.035*** 0.003*** 0.039***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Income 2001 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Strat. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes
Tests of weak Instruments
First stage F-Statistic 192433 59230 57553 43517 19088 18890
Partial R21 .185 .065 .063 .164 .056 .0548
Partial R22 .136 .147 .154
Tests of Moving Average
Arellano-Bond test, order 1 -250 -223 -227 -171 -159 -164.6
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Arellano-Bond test, order 2 -14 -15 -21 2.59 2.65 -0.929
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.008) (0.353)
Number of Observations 1690685 1690685 1690685 1690685 1690685 1690685
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All regressions include a constant and year dummies. Sample
control variable are dummy variables for main income source and dummy variables for the level of income in
2001. Age control variables are the taxpayers age, age squared, a dummy for taxpayers over 55 and a dummy
for taxpayers younger than 21 in 2001. Age control variables are the taxpayers age, age squared, a dummy
for taxpayers over 55 and a dummy for taxpayers younger than 21 in 2001. Demographic control variables
are dummy variables for single parents, handicapped taxpayers, two earner taxpayers, retired taxpayers and
non-taxable income. λ denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the Heckman sample selection model. The ﬁrst
stage F-Statistic is the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic with critical values of 11.04 for 5% relative IV bias
and 16.87 for 10% IV size, source Stock and Yogo (2005). Partial R21 is the partial R-squared for the growth
rate of the net-of-tax rate, Partial R22 is the partial R-squared for the lagged income growth, see Shea (1997)
and Godfrey (1999) for a description. The Arellano-Bond tests for ﬁrst-order and second-order of moving
average is asymptotically N(0,1) distributed.
Source:Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006.
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7.4.4 Including Taxpayers with Demographic Changes
















D new child -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.00) (0.00)
D change of state 0.086*** 0.087***
(0.01) (0.01)
D marriage 0.038*** 0.036***
(0.00) (0.00)




Strat. controls Yes Yes
Age controls Yes Yes
Demo. controls Yes Yes
Tests of weak Instruments
First stage F-Statistic 19572 32811
Partial R21 0.152 0.072
Partial R22 0.049 0.042
Tests of Moving Average
Arellano-Bond test, order 1 -174 -128.5
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000)
Arellano-Bond test, order 2 1.791 -3.41
(p-value) (0.073) (0.001)
Number of Observations 1951471 1951471
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. All regressions include a constant and year dummies. Sample
control variable are dummy variables for main income source and dummy variables for the level of income in
2001. Age control variables are the taxpayers age, age squared, a dummy for taxpayers over 55 and a dummy
for taxpayers younger than 21 in 2001. Age control variables are the taxpayers age, age squared, a dummy
for taxpayers over 55 and a dummy for taxpayers younger than 21 in 2001. Demographic control variables
are dummy variables for single parents, handicapped taxpayers, two earner taxpayers, retired taxpayers and
non-taxable income. λ denotes the inverse Mills ratio from the Heckman sample selection model. The ﬁrst
stage F-Statistic is the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic with critical values of 11.04 for 5% relative IV bias
and 16.87 for 10% IV size, source Stock and Yogo (2005). Partial R21 is the partial R-squared for the growth
rate of the net-of-tax rate, Partial R22 is the partial R-squared for the lagged income growth, see Shea (1997)
and Godfrey (1999) for a description. The Arellano-Bond tests for ﬁrst-order and second-order of moving
average is asymptotically N(0,1) distributed.
Source:Own computation based on German Taxpayer Panel 2001-2006.
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Table A.5 presents results of equation (3) including taxpayers that have severe demographic
changes such as marriage, divorce or one-time exceptional proﬁts which increases the sample
to 1,951,471 observations. Column (1) shows 2SLS results for the full model of equation (3)
with an ETI of 0.38 which is statistically not diﬀerent from the benchmark result from Table
3 with an ETI of 0.36. Results in column (2) are based on the 1951471 observations and
include a selection control following Heckman (1979) λ.71
These results imply that the employed observation selection does not induce a selection bias.
71Exclusion restrictions for the estimation of the selection control are obtained from the ﬁrst year of the
panel data. (1) Indicator for the number of diﬀerent income sources, (2) the variance of the incomes between
the income sources and (3) an indicator for negative incomes are used as exclusion restrictions.
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